War leaves behind in its wake new forms of cultural meaning, from changes in gender roles to reclaiming the pieces of a fallen society. Included in these new forms are interpretations of the war itself. Myths are created about the fighting of the war for various reasons, but mostly in order to allow for progress and recovery. In the aftermath of World War I, myths were proliferated throughout Germany regarding the experiences of war, specifically those of the soldiers fighting. This paper will shine a light on those myths in the hope of showing how they were created for the purpose of preserving public opinion and ensuring nationalism as a purveying view amongst German citizens.

 

At times myths come into existence as a way to explain certain situations that might otherwise negatively reflect on the war effort. The idea of a cover up can be seen as unethical, but necessary because without it, the institution could splinter from descent. Alan Kramer speaks of one such myth, having to do with the merciless slaughter of civilians by the German Army. In August 1914, the German Army was having a standoff with some French soldiers in Belgium, in which some of the Germans were killed. According to Alan Kramer, the deaths “the Germans claimed came from francs-tireurs (civilian resisters)… came in fact from the French soldiers” (Kramer 16). So sure of the fault of the civilian resisters, “even after the German troops were told the source of the firing, they persisted in their illusion,” threatening to kill the hostages they were holding if the non-existent civilians did not give up their weapons (Kramer 16). After nothing happened, the German commander mercilessly ordered the slaughter of the civilian hostages. The maintenance of the existence of the civilian resistors was not unique to this situation, but a product of German historical encounters with such rebels. The Germans relied on their national history for explanation and refused to accept any other belief, leading them to murder innocent civilians. As Kramer puts it, the myth was a “powerful generator of extreme violence” partly due to the “German army’s concept of international law, according to which civilians who took up weapons were illegal combatants, and which legitimated ruthless reprisals against the innocent” (Kramer 21). This myth, dating to the 1870-1 French-German conflict, was dangerous because it was used as a way to rationalize a situation decades later that was not similar, “a murderous scare [that] mobilized an entire army to fight an unarmed civilian population” (Kramer 22). This interpretation of events is directly contradicted by the overall presentation of the War to posterity.

 

The idea that was widespread as representing the actual events of the war was called the Myth of the War Experience. In this myth, the war was “looked back upon…as a meaningful and even sacred event,” particularly “in the defeated nations, where it was so urgently needed” (Mosse 7). There is quite a disconnect between the images of German soldiers massacring Belgian citizens and the idea of the war as being a sacred event. The purpose of the Myth of the War Experience was to fashion a new reality that could be preserved for future generations particularly because it “made reality easier to bear” (Mosse 9). In this aspect, it is easier to see why this myth was created. The reality of the war was a heavy burden, so the thought was to change the story. Additionally, another purpose was to create a sense of nationalism in order to give citizens of relevant countries a cause to get behind. World War I was one of the first wars “to be fought by citizen-armies, composed initially of a large number of volunteers who were committed to their cause and to their nation” (Mosse 9). In the wake of these wars, it became “necessary to legitimize and justify their sacrifice” (Mosse 10). After World War I, “Germany proved most hosiputable to the myth, where it informed most postwar politics. Germany’s defeat, the traumatic passage from war to peace, and the stress on the social fabric, all worked to strengthen nationalism as a civic faith and with it the Myth of the War Experience” (Mosse 10). In this case, the myth was a way of coping and dealing with what had happened, the agony of defeat.

 

Disconnect between the truth and the myth is known now, after many years of research and study, but in the immediate aftermath of the war, the truth was what was told to the people by the government. The myths became the facts and the loss of innocence faced by many soldiers became a simultaneous gain of revered status, birthed from the horrors witnessed, but never talked about.