In the wide field of political science, there is an ongoing debate about what is the more significant cause of electoral fraud. There is a main divide between two central beliefs of why the fraud is committed. “Some analysts underscore the importance of economic interests-landlords and industrialists” (Lehoucq 2003). Other scholars and researchers “suggest that partisanship explains the incidence of fraud” (Lehoucq 2003). This paper will argue that it is more partisan and political interests, than economic ones that motivate the fraud, with party leaders wanting to maintain their power over a region at any cost, instead of economic figures desiring their own interests to be represented. The sources utilized will consist of scholarly articles and books written by scholars who have a deeper knowledge of the field and who will provide a clear picture of the argument.

 

The first step in analyzing the causes and underlying purposes of electoral fraud is to define electoral fraud. While there may be different opinions regarding those purposes, scholars usually have a general consensus as to what they term as electoral fraud. McDonald describes it as “efforts to influence or control elections through illicit, clandestine manipulation of electoral processes” (McDonald 1972, 81). Other definitions are similar, but different, dealing with the broader sense of the term, saying, “an activity is fraudulent if its perpetrator wants it hidden from the public gaze” (Lehoucq 2003, 235). Which specific actions constitute fraud is also a point of agreement amongst political scientists. “Coercing voters at the polling station to cast ballots for party X or filling the ballot box with votes for party X” are ways that different entities can influence the outcome of a vote or results of an election (Lehoucq 2003, 235). When faced with the study of electoral fraud it is immediately noticeable that there is not a large amount of research or information on the subject, a fact that is slowly changing. The majority of sources used for this paper will revolve around specific examples and case studies of electoral fraud, with only a couple dealing with the fundamentals and intricate methods. Now that the basis of electoral fraud is understood and laid out, the two different purposes of why it is committed can be addressed, explained, and compared.

 

It is not an exaggeration to make the claim that money is equal to power or that the desire to make more money is enough to drive people to do whatever is necessary to maintain their status. The economic leaders of society are frequent committers of electoral fraud, usually on behalf of politicians they believe will keep them in their positions and levy policy that will be beneficial to them. In societies where electoral fraud occurs, the economic leaders would be in such fields as industry and agriculture, which are large realms habited by large numbers of people that can be influenced by the person in charge. Ziblatt speaks of the early free elections in Germany, where “agrarian and industrial employers [were] coercing employees to vote for certain parties” (Ziblatt 2009, 2). Fear of being let go or fired led to the employees simply following the instructions of their bosses, probably under the false assumption that what was good for the industry heads would be good for them as well.

 

The biggest source of information on the economic power behind controlling elections comes from Anderson, in her 2000 book Practicing Democracy: Elections and Political Culture in Imperial Germany. She talks about how in Imperial Germany, it was standard for economic bigwigs to throw their weight around in elections through what she deems as influencing the voter, “a nice word for intimidation” (Anderson 2000, 30). Another way of putting is “the insinuation of persons or groups in the voting process in ways that falsified the citizen’s choice” (Anderson 2000, 29). Voters were called corpses for their “allegedly cadaver-like submission to [their] masters” (Anderson 2000, 30). Influencing was the most frequent charge of electoral fraud and completely dwarfed any other charges. Her main points, as summed up by Lehoucq are that “eastern Junkers, coal mine owners and factory owners policed their peasants and employees to ensure that conservative parties won elections” (Lehoucq 2003, 249, Anderson 2000). It was clear in those days that “the interest of employers was more typically expressed in requiring their workers to vote” for the people that would enact policies and legislation beneficial to the employers (Anderson 2000, 154). The innate reason for the intimidation was made clear after the 1874 election, where the liberals showed gains over the conservatives, or the ones who represented the interests of the landowners. It became apparent that “an individual landowner’s ‘interest’ was politically inconsequential without the help of either a party or the government” (Anderson 2000, 176). The never-ending cycle of economic-induced electoral fraud can easily be attributed to the massive influence that employers hold over the people whose economic stability they control simply by giving a paycheck.

 

Lujo Brentano, in 1905, said that “the power the giant firms attain over those they employ extends even beyond the work situation; it extends to their entire social, religious, and political being” (Anderson 2000, 199).  An example of a economic leader exerting influence over subordinates occurred in the 1880s in Germany, when Egmont Tielsch, a porcelain manufacturer, made it clear to his workers that if the election did not support his party, they would reap the consequences. He is quoted as saying he would “not gladly employ those who work against the noble efforts of our sublime Kaiser to remove social evils” and that if the opposition party won they would “dismiss half of the workers and have to introduce the eight-hour day” (Anderson 2000, 203). The fear of losing work or pay was felt by all workers and therefore, they knew exactly who to vote for, simply due to the pressure placed on them. These underlying economic purposes are a stark contrast to the political purposes that also fuel electoral fraud, perhaps even more.

 

The allure of power is a strong one that can sometimes not be ignored and even more often, overpowers common sense, leading to electoral fraud by political players desiring their own personal status quo to remain the same. Some scholars choose to only consider electoral fraud as such when it is in this form. “Since the purpose of electoral fraud is political, it must be evaluated with universal standards oriented to political behavior” (McDonald 1972, 82). Those in power do their best to make it known to local politicians “that continued ‘good’ relations, meaning probably financial support, with the central government involves reciprocation in the form of electoral support” (McDonald 1972, 91). All of this pressure is apparent when “local ‘ward’ leaders perceive an obligation to ‘turn out the vote,’ and adopt measures necessary to deliver their quota” (McDonald 1972, 92). The entire process is cyclical, inspiring thoughts of clientelism, due to the quid pro quo nature of the exchanges. In addition, it is not challengers who are the most frequent committers of fraud. Instead, it is the incumbents who commit fraud often. “Botana argues that incumbent manipulation of the electoral system in Argentina preserved the conservative order’s control of a political system until 1916” (Lehoucq 2003, 249). The large majority of fraud is “the result of decisions made by dominant classes to maintain their grip over political systems and thereby ensure their economic and social hegemony” (Molina and Lehoucq 1999, 200). It may be that some in politics might want to try to change the system by playing by the rules, but they are a minority and it seems that to come out on top and stay there, one must toe the line between right and wrong, or outright cross it.

 

The world of politics has forever been associated with backroom shenanigans and under the table dealings, so it comes as no surprise that politicians and their parties commit electoral fraud in order to maintain their power and status. According to Ziblatt, electoral fraud “is the product of political actors’ efforts to tilt ‘the electoral playing field’ in their direction, thereby aiming to reduce the indeterminacy of elections” (Ziblatt 2009, 2). While examining petitions of electoral fraud in the 1890 and 1912 German elections, it is noticeable that a prevalent trend was the claim of “aggressive interventions of local government officials during election campaigns, undercutting fair competition” (Ziblatt 2009, 6). Just as influence is the leading method of economic-purposed electoral fraud, there is a similar process in politically motivated fraud. Known as the capture effect, “landed elites seek to preserve their electoral dominance in the countryside…via the capture of rural local public officials, such as mayors” (Ziblatt 2009, 14). These positions are then occupied by “government officials, who in turn commit electoral fraud as part of an institutionalized system of electoral manipulation and control” (Ziblatt 2009, 15). Wagner relates how a corruptly elected official would make it “clear to local rural mayors and poll station chairs that Conservative victories would be rewarded with infrastructure programs,” indirectly committing electoral fraud through the implication of rewards and benefits (Ziblatt 2009, 25, Wagner 2005, 422-23). As noted, the Conservative Party of Imperial Germany was a notorious example of how a political party in power freely committed electoral fraud, with “local officialdom, closely tied to and often manned by local landowning elites’ interests, worked on behalf of [the Conservative Party], blocking the exercise of free and fair elections” (Ziblatt 2009, 17). This example only serves to prove that politics take place in an arena where the only way to survive is to keep being sent back and the only way that will happen is if you cheat your way in.

 

Despite obvious differences, there exists an unusual amount common ground between scholars on both sides of this argument, due to the fact that there is only a central disagreement about which type of fraud more frequently. The large majority of scholars agree that “the study of electoral fraud is an ideal way to shed light on whether political behavior is shaped more by sociological factors or by institutional arrangements” (Molina and Lehoucq 1999, 199). Another area where scholars agree is that “the frequent undermining of free and fair… suggest[s] that sometimes adopting new democratic institutions is not enough” (Ziblatt 2009, 1). Finally, even if they could not agree on anything else, political scientists can agree on the simple fact that electoral fraud is a serious problem in the world and poses a problem to fledgling and developing democracies that cannot be ignored.

 

 At this point, we have two distinct origins of electoral fraud, but are they really as distinct as we think? It is easy to broadly compare the two schools of thought, saying that both forms of electoral fraud are working toward the goal of denying the general populace its choice of elected official, but there may be more to it than that. One obvious difference between the two is that when the fraud is economically driven, the actors probably have a more hands-on approach to carrying out the fraud. Comparatively, if the actors are politicians who have a public image to protect, the fraud is likely committed indirectly, through the use of a third party or some other method to try and distance the act from the beneficiary. By taking another look at the evidence, another possibility forms. These two differing views of electoral fraud could, in fact, be consequences of each other. Essentially, the politicians that want to be reelected to maintain their power lean on local governments to deliver votes. In turn, those local governments turn to economic leaders of the region, knowing that they hold sway over their employees. Finally, the economic leaders threaten or coerce their employees, thinking that the politicians will reward them once reelected. All this is a vicious cycle by any definition of the term. Looking at it in a cyclical way is not always what is actually happening. An economic leader in a community might commit fraud with the hope that he will reap the benefits from the policies he believes those elected will enact. In that, there lies the potential for failure due to the not knowing for sure whether a ploy will pay off. There are many comparisons and explanations of fraud, each of them unique and circumstantial, but it is also clear which one is more prominent and more important.

 

Politicians and political parties are more likely to commit electoral fraud to further their goals than economic leaders are. Now, that is not to say that the economic hegemons do not commit fraud, for as has been noted, they most certainly do, but the politicians and parties are the ones who commit fraud more regularly and on wider scales, having greater effects. The economic leaders were still subject to the wills and whims of the politicians, therefore proving that the politicos were more powerful and influential. Although blunt and not taking into consideration other factors, it could be observed that economic leaders manipulating the election and vote are simply pawns of the politicians, another tool used to maintain power. All of this evidence points to the fraud committed as more motivated by partisan interests, with the politicians and parties representing those interests.

 

 

 

 

List of works-cited

Anderson, Margaret L. 2000. Practicing Democracy: Elections and Political Culture in Imperial

Germany. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Lehoucq, Fabrice Edouard, and Ivan Molina Jimenez. 1999. “Political Competition and

Electoral Fraud: A Latin American Case Study.” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 30 (2): 199–234.

Lehoucq, Fabrice Edouard. 2003. “Electoral Fraud: Causes, Types, and Consequences.” Annual

Review of Political Science. 6: 233–56.

McDonald, Ronald H. 1972. “Electoral Fraud and Regime Controls in Latin America.” The

Western Political Quarterly. 25 (1): 81-93.

Wagner, Patrick. 2005. Bauern, Junker und Beamte: Lokale Herrschaft und Partizipation im

Ostelbien des 19. Jahrhunderts. [Farmer, Junker, and Bureaucrat] Gottingen: Wallstein Verlag.

Ziblatt, Daniel. 2009. “Shaping Democratic Practice and the Causes of Electoral Fraud:

The Case of Nineteenth-Century Germany.” American Political Science Review. 103 (1): 1-21.